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ABSTRACT 
 
Objectives: To report the implementation of a trigger review method (TRM) in primary care, 
with a particular focus on its impact on patient safety-related findings  
 
Design: Cross-sectional structured review of random samples (n=25) of electronic records of 
‘high risk’ patient groups conducted twice per year (each for a retrospective review period of 
3-months) 
 
Setting: 274 general practices in two regions of Scotland 
 
Intervention: Contractual incentivisation of TRM implementation  
 
Main outcome measures: Practice participation rate; characteristics of patient safety 
incidents (PSIs), e.g. their prevalence, type, perceived severity and preventability; and 
actions or intended actions undertaken during and after trigger reviews. 
Results 
274 of 318 eligible practices (86.2%) returned 536 TRM Summary Reports which outlined 
findings from reviews of 13,351 electronic patient records.    1887 (14.1%) PSIs were 
recorded, with a mean of 3.5 (536/1887) per Summary Report(SD±1.6).  Of these, 830 
(44.0%) were judged to have caused mild to moderate harm, with 262 (13.9%) cases 
resulting in more severe harm.  A total of 852 PSIs (46.2%) were rated as preventable or 
potentially preventable.  In 459 Summary Reports (85.6%), reviewers indicated 
implementingone or more improvement actions during the actual TRM process;  and 2177 
actions after completion of the TRM process [mean 4.1 (SD±3.3) actions per review].   
 
Conclusions 
The great majority of clinician reviewers ‘successfully’ applied the TRM, uncovering 
important but previously undetected PSIs which prompted care teams to take action during 
and after the trigger reviews.  The method and data generated havethe potential to drive 
improvements in related care processes at the practice, regional and national health system 
level. TRM arguably increased ‘ownership’ of the safety challenge and clinician engagement 
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in implementing their solutions to specific problems identified. Our results suggest the TRM 
has potential as a feasible, pragmatic approach to improving primary care safety and quality.  
 
Keywords: patient safety, trigger tool, general practice, adverse events, error, harm 
 
 
  
4 
 
Introduction 
Patient safety is a priority for all modern health care systems (1-2).  However, it is widely 
accepted that errors do occur, can be preventable and that a significant minority result in 
patient harm of a temporary nature or more severe in terms of ongoing physical or mental 
impairment and even death (3-5).  Over a decade ago, a seminal United Kingdom (UK) policy 
publication recommended that health care organisations should systematically learn lessons 
from patient safety incidents, and that system-wide safety interventions were a necessary 
part of this collective learning and improvement process (2). More recently, Vincent and 
colleagues stated the case for the importance of identifying and measuring harm as a core 
patient safety improvement goal (6), while the Francis Inquiry report (7) into failings in care 
at the mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in England made multiple recommendations 
on this issue, including the need for it to be a core organisational priority.  The subsequent 
Berwick Report noted (8), however, that there is currently limited capacity to analyse, 
monitor or learn from safety related information at the healthcare organisational level. To 
date, much of the patient safety agenda has focussed on the hospital sector; patient safety 
is, however, also an issue for general practice/family practice. 
 
In UK general practice, as in other settings, a feasible method of contributing to these 
learning, improvement and (potential) measurement objectives on a systematic basis is 
lacking (9).  Contributory factors include the limited engagement by general practitioners in 
formal incident reporting systems (9-12), while learning from routine significant event 
analyses is rarely captured and acted upon either at the level of practices or regional 
healthcare organisations (13). 
 
Patient safety incidents (PSIs) in UK general practice - defined here as “any unintended or 
unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving 
NHS care“ – (14) are typically reported by patients, identified directly by clinicians or 
highlighted by colleagues as part of routine practice.  However, some safety incident types 
and latent hazards are not detected so easily, and there is evidence that the majority of 
incidents remain undetected (15,16). Even when PSIs are detected, they are typically not 
shared within the practice team, nor formally reported and rarely lead to further action.  
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The recent adaptation, re-design and testing of a trigger review method (TRM) for general 
practice – also known as a ‘trigger tool’ – offers one approach to identifying such events 
(17), providing practices with an opportunity to reflect and act in the light of events and thus 
strongly emphasizing their importance as change catalysts. Using the TRM to systematically 
review the clinical records of their own patients for incidents and latent threats provides 
care teams with a personal perspective of the safety of their care and potentially provides 
valuable opportunities that are relevant to their practices to take pre-emptive action before 
harm can occur (18-20). 
 
The TRM was adapted from the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Global Trigger 
Tool (21-22) in 2007, but has since evolved differently in the Scottish general practice 
context from its originally intended harm measurement purpose to a method of identifying 
PSIs and, more importantly, improvement opportunities (19).  It enables trained clinician 
reviewers (e.g. GPs or practice nurses) to screen and review small, random samples of their 
electronic medical records of pre-defined ‘high risk’ patient groups (e.g. those over 75 years 
with co-morbidities and polypharmacy) for PSIs in a rapid, structured and focused manner. 
This is carried out by searching each of the five common sections of every medical record 
sequentially for the presence of pre-defined ‘triggers’, which are clinical prompts or ‘signs’ in 
the record that may indicate the occurrence of PSIs (Box 1). A maximum time of 20 minutes 
is allocated per record and three calendar months are retrospectively reviewed in each 
record.  The expectation is that the identification of PSIs will lead to immediate 
improvements in system processes in some cases (undertaken during the review itself) or 
serve as a mechanism to guide further action after the review by other means, e.g. 
significant event analysis or criterion audit (13, 23).  
 
In terms of implementation in the UK, evidence of TRM participation can now be submitted 
as a Quality Improvement Activity as part of GP Appraisal in Scotland (24), while the Royal 
College of General Practitioners (RCGP) has also included the method as a potential evidence 
source for revalidation throughout the UK (25).  Similarly, it may also inform quality 
improvement obligations as part of specialty training for general practice (20).  In April 2013, 
the TRM was included in the Scottish version of the pay-for-performance Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) contract; participation in this also doubled as a core 
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contribution to the goals of the Scottish Patient Safety Programme in Primary Care (26).  The 
contract financially incentivised all Scottish general practices (c1000) to apply the TRM on 
two occasions over a 12-month period and report their findings and improvement actions to 
their regional National Health Service (NHS) Board. .  
 
Despite the rapid adoption and promotion of the TRM, there is little empirical data about 
the characteristics of the PSIs being identified, and whether its application leads to 
improvement in the safety and quality of care. This study provides the first known 
opportunity to examine what is being uncovered and achieved across regional care systems 
by reporting the findings from two Scottish NHS Board areas that implemented the TRM in 
general practice.  Our aims are therefore twofold: 
1. To report the characteristics of the PSIs that were detected and reported, including 
their prevalence, type of care processes they relate to and their perceived severity 
and preventability. 
2. To report the actions and intended actions undertaken during and after the trigger 
reviews.  
 
 
Methods 
Design  
A cross-sectional review of 25 electronic patient records (for a retrospective period of 3-
months) conducted twice per year by clinicians trained in using the TRM.  
 
Setting and sample 
The study was set in two Scottish National Health Service (NHS) Board areas  containing 56 
and 262 general medical practices respectively, and providing health and social care to 
around 30% of the Scottish patient population.  Both regions include a range of 
socioeconomic, semi-rural, urban, suburban and inner city settings.  Participating practices 
were those undertaking the TRM as part of contractual incentivisation and reporting these 
data to their NHS Board.  
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TRM Training 
One or more clinicians nominated by the practice (typically a GP and practice nurse) were 
trained in the TRM by an informed GP while attending local collaborative learning events 
arranged by each NHS Board. Training typically lasted 1.5 to 3-hours and involved an audio-
visual presentation and a practical TRM exercise using simulated medical records containing 
‘hidden’ PSIs for individual delegates to detect. This was followed by feedback and open 
discussion.  A range of educational material, including a practical application guide and 
detailed examples of previously completed reviews, were also provided for reference.   
 
Conducting the TRM 
Two trigger reviews were conducted, at least 6-months apart, during April 2013 to March 
2014 by a clinician trained in the TRM.  Previous TRM pilot testing has demonstrated the 
validity of the triggers and the ability of clinical reviewers to detect PSIs using this approach 
(17, 19, 20, 23). The process was implemented as follows:  
 The practice chose a ‘high risk’ patient group on which to conduct the TRM review 
from a list of examples provided and previously published (23).  
 A practice team member (e.g. practice manager, administrator or clinician) compiled 
a list of all relevant patients from the practice’s clinical information system. 
 A random sample of 25 records was identified from the list (using a random number 
generator or similar process) 
 A clinician trained in the TRM process then reviewed a three-month period in each 
electronic patient record. The review time period was any three consecutive calendar 
months in each patient record before the actual review dates.   
 Data were collected using a pre-designed proforma (see below) which also contained 
details of each of the clinical triggers as a cognitive aid to guide a rapid review 
process. 
 Practices repeated this process when conducting the second review 6-months later, 
although they had the option to decide whether to review another random sample of 
the same patient group, or alternatively choose another ‘high risk’ group.   
 
Data collection 
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Data were recorded by reviewers on a standardised Summary Report proforma (Appendix 1) 
for each batch of 25 medical records reviewed. The proforma is structured over two pages to 
guide reviewers through the three consecutive steps of the TRM: (1) Planning and 
preparation; (2) Reviewing the records; and (3) Action, reflection and learning.  Data 
collected includes the number of detected ‘triggers’, details of PSIs uncovered (including 
judgements on perceived severity and preventability), learning needs identified and 
immediate or future actions that were or should be taken to minimise risks of PSI re-
occurrence, and length of time taken to conduct the review.  Practices were advised that if 
five PSIs were detected before the full 25 records were reviewed then this was considered a 
sufficient workload and the remaining time of the review should be allocated to 
improvement actions. Practices submitted their completed Summary Sheets to the local NHS 
Boards as evidence of TRM completion (for financial reimbursement) and to enable data 
analysis to facilitate local learning. 
 
Data analysis 
TRM data were provided to the authors for analysis by both NHS Boards.  Data from all the 
submitted proforma were extracted to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet by a single 
administrator, and the PSIs were then coded (by CdW, CB & SL) and analysed (by CdW) using 
simple descriptive statistical methods.  The types of reported PSIs were categorised jointly 
by the authors through an iterative process of descriptive coding of the recorded incidents 
and consensus-building to resolve disagreements. 
 
Quantitative data were analysed using simple descriptive statistics (e.g. frequency counts 
and percentages). Free text entries were grouped into major themes. 
 
Results 
Response rate 
A total of 274 of 318 eligible practices (86.2%) from the two NHS Boards returned 536 
Summary Reports which outlined findings from reviews of 13,351 electronic patient records. 
In NHS Board ‘A’, 45/56 practices returned at least one completed Summary Report (80.4%), 
with 11/56 failing to return any (19.6%). Of these submissions, 74 reports from 44 practices 
(97.8%) were suitable for coding and these summarize the findings from 1843 electronic 
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patient records. For NHS Board ‘B’, 229/262 practices (87.4%) returned a total of 462 
Summary Sheets that were suitable for coding, while 7/262 (2.7%) returns were unsuitable 
for coding and 26/262 (10.0%) did not return any. The 462 reviews summarize the findings 
from 11,508 electronic patient records, with the vast majority of reviews (92.7%) being 
undertaken by general practitioners (GPs).   
 
Patient safety incidents 
Detected PSIs 
A total of 1887 PSIs were reported, which equates to 14.1% of all records reviewed and a 
mean of 3.5 (536/1887) per Summary Sheet (SD±1.6). NHS Board ‘A’ reviewers documented 
251 PSIs (13.6%) and a mean of 3.4 PSIs per Summary Sheet (SD ±1.6). In 3/74 Summary 
Sheets (4.5%), reviewers did not record a single PSI.  For NHS Board ‘B’ reviewers reported a 
total of 1636 PSIs (14.2%), with a mean of 3.5 (SD ±1.6) PSIs per Summary Sheet.  In 21/262 
Summary Sheets (4.5%), reviewers did not record a single PSI.  Selected examples of 
detected PSIs are shown in Box 1. 
 
Characteristics of PSIs: severity, preventability and type 
For both NHS Boards combined, a total of 830 PSIs (44.8%) were judged to have caused mild 
to moderate harm to patients, with 262 cases (14.2%) resulting in more severe harm.  A total 
of 852 PSIs (46.9%) were rated as preventable or potentially preventable (Table 1). Details of 
the most common types of PSIs are outlined in Table 2. The ten medications that were most 
frequently implicated are included for interest.   
 
Improvement actions 
Actions undertaken during reviews 
Reviewers indicated undertaking one or more actions relating to the safety and quality of 
care during trigger reviews in 459/536 trigger summaries (85.6%).  
There were four main types of immediate actions, which relates to the following care 
processes in general practice: (i) coding and record keeping; (ii) prescribing and medication; 
(iii) communication; and (iv) further investigation and follow-up. Examples of the types of 
actions and a selection of verbatim illustrative quotes from the summary sheets are shown 
in Table 3. 
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Actions and intended actions undertaken after trigger reviews  
Overall, reviewers undertook or intended to undertake 2177 actions subsequent to and as a 
result of performing 536 trigger reviews, with a mean of 4.1 actions after each trigger review 
(SD±3.3).  The most common types of actions were ‘feedback to colleagues’ (41.2%) and ‘add 
to appraisal’ (18.1%) while the least common was using the PDSA method (1.5%) The 
number and types of specific actions are shown in Table 4 and the proportions of the two 
Boards are compared. 
 
Reported trigger review times  
The overall time to conduct reviews (of a set of 25 records), implement or consider action 
and complete Summary Sheets for both NHS Boards was 86,253 minutes (n=495 reviews) 
with a mean of 174.2minutes/trigger review (SD ±78.4 minutes, range 30 to 480 minutes).   
 
Discussion 
This study reports the main outcomes from the implementation of the TRM in general 
practices across two NHS Health Boards in the west of Scotland.  The vast majority of 
general practices participated in this patient safety improvement initiative and applied the 
TRM to the medical records of their own patients.  The main findings are that most clinician 
reviewers were able to detect PSIs in the medical records of their patients and were willing 
to report these. In addition, the majority reportedly took or intended to take a wide range of 
formal and informal improvement actions, including protocol revisions, significant event 
analyses, clinical audits, sharing learning points in their teams and editing and updating 
medical records to minimse risks. 
 
The majority of detected incidents were categorised as low-to-moderate severity, ‘near 
misses’ and latent system hazards. The types of PSIs uncovered by the TRM will be familiar 
to most patient safety researchers and indeed primary care clinicians.  We would argue, 
however, that the main value of the reported PSIs was derived from them being detected 
within the records of the reviewers’ practices in a “real-world” setting - rather than their 
type or frequency.  The TRM process potentially facilitated clinician engagement by 
providing opportunities to tackle issues that are perceived as relevant to individual practice 
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teams and clinician reviewers.  This facilitation of potential clinician engagement is arguably 
one of the crucial differences between the primary care TRM and other similar improvement 
interventions and may promote its sustainability and routine use in primary care settings 
where adequate incentivisation and protected time are available.   
 
Typically, frontline staff first need to assure themselves that there is a real and important 
problem which relates specifically to them. In NHS Scotland, general practitioners (GPs) are 
independent contractors with the freedom to choose whether they participate in safety 
improvement initiatives or not.  In our experience the vast majority perceived patient safety 
as important, but only one of a number of priorities.  GPs’ participation in an initiative 
increases if they understand and are able to see quick, unambiguous and practical evidence 
that an intervention has value for them and their patient population.   
If we assume the reported study data is indicative of the TRM ‘working’ in these two NHS 
Boards, then it would be fair to say that with its current national implementation it should 
detect PSIs in all other NHS Board regions. Moreover, based on the scale of our findings, 
there is a possibility of this approach having demonstrated that it is potentially the most 
effective of all current methods for detecting patient safety-related issues in the Scottish 
(and by extension UK) general practice setting.  With the current focus on patient safety 
(26), we suggest that the TRM is a potentially feasible and effective safety improvement 
intervention which could be applied more widely in UK general practice and international 
family practice settings, either as part of a large-scale safety improvement initiative or 
voluntarily as a simple quality improvement activity. 
 
However, implementing and sustaining safety interventions in complex healthcare 
environments is problematic for a whole raft of cultural, social and resource based reasons 
(27).  It is suggested that intervention success is predicated on three common conditions all 
being met: 1. making it straightforward to do; 2. measuring and providing feedback on 
related outcomes; and 3. normalising the intervention as part of routine work to improve 
performance and change culture (27,28).  Our findings provide some evidence of the ability 
of care teams to understand and apply the TRM to detect PSIs at the practice level 
(Condition 1) and the potential for organisational level monitoring and measurement to feed 
back learning from safety-related issues across practices (Condition 2).  However, for the full 
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benefits of the TRM to be realised it would require to be routinely implemented, perhaps in 
a very targeted way. One example might be to measure and reduce avoidable harm from 
Warfarin toxicity. However, this may require linkage with multiple intervention strategies 
(such as comparative and highly visible audit and feedback) to drive improvements on a 
regional and national basis (Condition 3). 
 
As part of recent related research on the TRM potential to reliably measure harm rates in 
general practice (29), a basic formula was designed using computer generated simulation to 
inform sample sizes (the minimum numbers required are similar to those reported in this 
study) and acceptable levels of statistical precision and power necessary for the purpose of 
detecting whether improvements in safety performance are being realised.  Therefore, by 
repeating the implementation approach reported in this study on a targeted patient sub-
population there is the potential to test ‘Condition 3’ by measuring, monitoring and driving 
improvement on a regional and national basis. Vincent and colleague’s recently published 
framework for the measurement and monitoring of safety supports this approach by calling 
for more ‘specific and nuanced’ measures of harm of direct relevance to different care 
settings to be developed (6).   
 
Practical implications 
Besides potentially providing key insights into safety and risk matters, application of the TRM 
importantly may also serve to facilitate practice and organisational learning through 
integration with quality improvement methods such as Significant Event Analysis (13), Plan-
Do-Study cycles (30), clinical care bundles (31) and criterion based audit (32).  For example, 
to assess in much greater detail system wide human factors interaction issues contributing 
to delayed diagnoses, sub-optimal therapeutic management, disease and drug monitoring, 
and problems with computerised support technologies. This is particularly helpful given that 
appraisal and revalidation requires GPs to analyse two significant events per year (with the 
UK General Medical Council encouraging these events to be PSIs rather than broader quality 
of care issues).  Identification and analysis of these previously undetected PSIs is particularly 
pertinent to improving the opportunity cost of significant event analysis topics.   
 
Strengths and limitations 
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There was high level engagement from practices in both NHS Board areas in response to 
incentivisation to apply the TRM, which provided significant levels of data on captured PSIs.  
Baed on this study, the TRM  can clearly identify PSIs which provides evidence of its validity 
and appears to have been ‘tolerated’ by large numbers of clinicians trained in the process 
(evidence for professional acceptability of the method) in a relative short timescale 
(evidence for feasibility).  However, these data are self-reported and so subject to bias as 
there was no means to externally verify data quality, particularly in terms of judgements on 
what constitutes a PSI, how severe it is and if it is preventable.  Inevitably there will be inter-
rater variations on these issues.   
 
Conclusion 
Our understanding of the types and nature of the threats to patient safety is continually 
increasing (33). Patient safety research in primary care is beginning to evolve and 
demonstrate the need for co-ordinated action to make systems safer (5, 9, 13); and from this 
perspective the rationale for improvement seems obvious.  However, much of the primary 
care workforce is unaware of the evolving evidence base , nor do they necessarily share this 
perspective.  Consequently, efforts to harness the patient safety literature in order to 
meaningfully improve care have so far had limited demonstrable effect (34).  In response, 
we developed, tested, and implemented the TRM and propose this approachas a pragmatic 
bridge between: (i) research/academic general practice and clinical service delivery; (ii) 
national and individualized approaches to improve patient safety; and (iii) initiatives focusing 
only on measurement or improvement. There may not be any patient safety panaceas yet, 
but our findings suggest the TRM is a potentially feasible approach to identifying and 
addressing a range of important safety issues that were previously undetected in the 
medical records of ‘high risk’ patient groups in general practice.     
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Box 1. A selection of detected PSIs recorded in Summary Sheets 
 
 Breathlessness requiring admission in a lady who had her diuretics and ACE [Angiotensin 
converting enzyme] inhibitors stopped [previously] during an episode of diarrhoea; 
 Prescription marked as "1 tab daily" - 100 tablets issued on each occasion. Incorrectly marked 
dose, as patient taking 2 tablets daily for 6 days and 3 tablets on day 7; 
 Fall at home - long lie - resulting in confusion dehydration and acute kidney injury requiring 
admission. Patient was not taking medication appropriately and using old drugs lying in house; 
 82 year old female patient was issued with a prescription for atorvastatin 80mg instead of 
40mg, despite a documented adverse reaction on the 80mg dose; 
 Ibuprofen given as acute to already anaemic patient (Haemoglobin <10.0); 
 Delayed diagnosis of incarcerated/strangulated hernia.  Led to prolonged eleven day hospital 
admission.  Earlier diagnosis may have resulted in shorter hospital stay; 
 Dose of amitriptyline increased to 25mg [and] original dose not deleted; 
 Patient with Haemoglobin=9.2 [and heart failure] untreated and not retested for this; 
 Patient presented as worried she may be pregnant and taking methotrexate. Pregnancy test 
negative. No record in the notes that patient had received counseling; 
 Patient fell due to dizziness. Symptom may [have been] related to increase in oxycontin for 
back pain; 
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Table 1.The severity and preventability of PSIs as rated by clinical reviewers in both NHS Boards 
 
Rating 
scale 
Description 
All 
n (%) 
 
 
Severity 
 
1 
Any incident with the potential to 
cause harm. 
758 (41.0) 
2 
Mild harm, inconvenience, further 
follow-up or investigation to ensure 
no harm occurred. 
541 (29.2) 
3 
Moderate harm: required 
intervention or duration for longer 
than a day. 
289 (15.6) 
4 
Prolonged, substantial or 
permanent harm, including 
hospitalisation. 
262 (14.2) 
   
 Preventability  
1 
Not preventable and originated in 
secondary care. 
262 (14.4) 
2 
Preventable and originated in 
secondary care OR not preventable 
and originated in primary care. 
704 (38.7) 
3 
Potentially preventable and 
originated in primary care. 
465 (25.6) 
4 
Preventable and originate in 
primary care. 
387 (21.3) 
 
  
20 
 
Table 2. Frequency and details of main types of PSIs and the most common medications 
implicated 
 
Characteristics of PSIs   
All 
n (%) 
  
Types of PSIs  
Medication (includes prescribing) 650 (34.7) 
Communication (includes all types of 
correspondence) 
108 (5.8) 
Coding / record keeping 145 (7.7) 
Monitoring (includes access and ongoing 
care issues) 
324 (17.3) 
Diagnosis and diagnosing 46 (2.5) 
Investigations 54 (2.9) 
Medical equipment (includes IT) 15 (0.8) 
Unclear or insufficient information to 
classify PSI 
512 (27.4) 
Healthcare acquired infection 18 (1.0) 
  
  
Ten medications most commonly 
implicated in PSIs 
 
Antibiotics 46 (6.5) 
Warfarin  139 (19.5) 
Opiates, e.g. codeine, morphine, tramadol 27 (3.8) 
Diuretics 47 (6.6) 
ACE / ARB 45 (6.3) 
Oral hypoglycaemic agents 27 (3.8) 
DMARDs (including methotrexate) 78 (11.0) 
Not specified 56 (7.9) 
NSAIDs, including aspirin 52 (7.3) 
Antidepressants 20 (2.8) 
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Table 3. Types of actions undertaken during trigger reviews with selected examples and quotes 
Main care 
process actions 
relate to 
Examples of 
actions  
 
Selected quotes 
    
Coding / record 
keeping 
 Update coding 
(disease registers, 
QOF data) 
 ‘Review of records revealed 
that DVT and pre-eclampsia had 
not been coded as active 
significant problems. Codes 
added to records’ (HBA) 
 The patient in [PSI X] has had 
his coding corrected and he 
is now on the QOF register 
again (HBB) 
 Updated missed read code 
for patient with aortic valve 
replacement (HBB) 
 
 Correct coding / 
records 
 ‘[I] spotted a couple of coding 
errors and also an entry that 
had clearly been made in the 
wrong set of notes. These were 
addressed as I went along’ 
(HBA) 
 ‘Incorrect Heart Failure code 
removed.  Adverse reaction to 
ACE recorded’ (HBA) 
 Some codes have had 
priority level changed (HBB) 
 The patients GP record has 
been amended to remove 
the incorrect code for 
bladder cancer (HBB) 
 Add a clinical entry 
or set a task 
‘reminder’ or 
‘recall’  
 
 ‘Yellow flag reminder added 
regarding methadone’ (HBA) 
 
Prescribing 
(medication-
related 
processes)  
 Changes to 
medication items 
(commence new 
drugs, change or 
discontinue 
current drugs)  
 ‘During the review I reviewed 
repeat medications.  I looked at 
when medications were last 
requested.  I deleted 
medications that had not been 
requested for some time’  
(HBA)  
 Stopped inappropriate anti-
emetic (HBB) 
  Perform 
medication reviews 
 ‘Medication reviewed to ensure 
appropriateness of 
prescriptions’ (HBA) 
 
 Where it was felt 
appropriate to remove 
medication which had not 
recently been requested 
from the repeat medication 
list, this was done. (HBB) 
 
Communication 
(monitoring, 
clarification, 
review, 
education) 
 Clarify 
management plan 
and who is 
responsible for 
delivery with 
secondary care 
 ‘For DNA hospital appointments 
[we] ensured patients had 
received appointments from 
hospital. Also ensured 
addresses/contact details for 
patients are up to date.’ (HBA) 
 Contact was made with the 
hospital re missing A&E 
admission paperwork for 
patient (HBB) 
 Clarify patients’ 
understanding of 
their management 
 ‘In the first patient, his repeat 
medication was updated after 
speaking to him on the phone’ 
 Contact made with the 
patient identified as having 
numerous contacts with 
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plan (HBA) 
 ‘Two patients [were] contacted 
to clarify prescribing doses’ 
(HBA) 
 
OOH. Discussed this 
behaviour, emphasised the 
importance of not abusing 
this service and encouraged 
the patient to contact the 
surgery during normal 
opening hours if there is a 
problem. (HBB) 
  Providing 
information or 
educating patients 
 ‘[I] informed patient to stop 
Aspirin one week before next 
hospital appointment’ (HBA) 
 
 Medications were updated 
and discussed with patients 
during immediate discharge 
medicines reconciliation 
(HBB) 
  Confirming that 
intended actions 
(e.g. scheduled 
monitoring) took 
place 
 ‘[I] phoned anti-coag clinic to 
check INR recently done’ (HBA) 
 ‘[I] ensured housebound 
patients on DMARDs are 
monitored as per guidelines’ 
(HBA) 
 
 Patient having monthly 
DMARD bloods - phoned 
rheumatology nurses to 
check if it should be 4 or 8 
weekly (HBB) 
Investigations 
and follow-up 
 Arrange an 
appointment with 
the reviewing 
clinician or another 
practice team 
member 
 ‘I invited a patient with CKD to 
attend for BP which is overdue’  
(HBA) 
 ‘Patient in PSI3 [were] phoned 
and asked to make an 
appointment to see GP’ (HBA) 
 
 One patient who was 
overdue monitoring and not 
responded to letters has had 
methotrexate removed from 
repeat and a nurse 
telephone call booked to 
discuss (HBB) 
 Refer to another 
health care 
provider  
 ‘[I sent a] letter to Cardiology 
about this patients AF diagnosis 
and CHADS recommendation’ 
(HBA) 
 
 Arrange additional 
investigations for a 
patient 
 ‘Two patients on diuretics and 
ACE with no U&Es in last year 
invited for U&E [check]. One 
patient with Hb=9.2 and no 
recheck for a year recalled for 
blood test.’  (HBA) 
 
 Patient was lettered to 
attend GP for medication 
review and monitoring 
bloods to be performed. 
(HBB) 
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Table 4. Summary of the action(s)* reviewers indicated they undertook or planned to undertake after 
the trigger reviews  
Description of action 
All 
n (%) 
Significant event analysis 250 (11.5) 
Clinical audit 138 (6.3) 
PDSA cycle 32 (1.5) 
Feedback to colleagues 898 (41.2) 
Make a specific improvement 220 (10.1) 
Add to appraisal documentation 393 (18.1) 
Protocol update 190 (8.7) 
Other* 54 (2.5) 
Total 2175 
*More than one option could be selected 
 
